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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction in this appeal pursuant to Rule 14 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission") err 
when it concluded, as a matter of law, that the appellant ("Hercu-
les") had the burden of proof to "establish that the market value 
of the subject property is other than that as determined by the 
Respondent" (the "County")? 
This issue should be reviewed under the "correction of 
error" standard. No deference is given to the Commission's 
conclusions of law. See U.C.A. § 59-1-610(1)(b); OSI Industries, 
Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Sept. 10, 
1993). 
2. Are the Commission's factual findings concerning the 
value of Hercules' property supported by substantial evidence? 
This Court is required to give deference to the factual 
findings of the Commission and to review the Findings of Fact under 
a "substantial evidence" standard. Id.; U.C.A. § 59-1-610(1)(a). 
3. Did the Commission err in reviewing the value of 
Hercules' land when the value of the land had not been specifically 
BTP15.062 1 
disputed? 
This is a mixed issue of fact and law and should be 
reviewed under the "correction of error" standard. No deference is 
given to the Commission's conclusions of law. See U.C.A. § 59-1-
610(l)(b); OSI Industriesf Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 221 
Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Sept. 10, 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann., § 59-2-102 (7): 
"Fair market value:" means the amount at which 
property would change hands between a willing 
buyer and a willing seller, neither being 
under any compulsion to buy or sell and both 
having reasonable knowledge of the relevant 
facts, and includes the adjustment for intan-
gible values under Sections 59-2-304 and 59-2-
201 for real property assessed by the county 
assessor or the commission. 
Utah Code Ann., § 59-2-103 (1): 
All tangible taxable property shall be as-
sessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate 
on the basis of its fair market value, as 
valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided 
by law. 
Utah Code Ann., § 61-2b-3: 
(1) It is unlawful for anyone to prepare an 
appraisal, an appraisal report, or a certified 
appraisal report relating to real estate or 
real property in this state without first 
being registered or certified in accordance 
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with the provisions of this chapter. 
(2) This section does not apply to: 
(a) a real estate broker or sales agent 
licensed by this state who, in the ordi-
nary course of his business as defined by 
Section 61-2-2, given an opinion: 
(i) regarding the value of real estate; 
(ii) to a potential seller or third 
party recommending a listing price of 
real estate; or 
(iii) to a potential buyer or third 
party recommending a purchase price of 
real estate; 
(b) an employee of a company who states 
an opinion of value or prepares a report 
containing value conclusions relating to 
real estate or real property solely for 
the company's use; 
(c) any official or employee of a gov-
ernment agency while acting solely within 
the scope of his duties, unless otherwise 
required by Utah law; 
(d) an auditor or accountant who states 
an opinion of value or prepares a report 
containing value conclusions relating to 
real estate or real property while per-
forming an audit; 
(e) an individual except an individual 
who is required to be registered or cer-
tified under this chapter, who states an 
opinion about the value of property in 
which he has an ownership interest; 
(f) an individual who states an opinion 
of value if no consideration is paid or 
agreed to be paid for the opinion and no 
other party is reasonably expected to 
rely on the individual's appraisal exper-
tise; 
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(g) an individual, such as a researcher 
or a secretary, who does not render sig-
nificant professional assistance, as 
defined by the board, in arriving at a 
real estate appraisal analysis, opinion, 
or conclusions; or 
(h) an attorney authorized to practice 
law in this state who, in the course of 
his practice, utilizes an appraisal re-
port governed by this chapter or who 
states an opinion of the value of real 
estate. 
Utah State Constitution, Article XIII, Section 2(1): 
All tangible property in the state, not except 
under the laws of the United States, or under 
this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform 
and equal rate in proportion to its value, to 
be ascertained as provided by law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The County does not disagree with Hercules/ Statement of the 
Case as set forth in items I (Nature of Case), II (Course of 
Proceedings), and III (Decision of the Commission). Hereinafter, 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision of the 
Commission, dated June 10, 1993, which is the subject of this 
appeal, will be referred to as the "Final Decision". 
The County does, however, take issue with certain of the 
statements contained in Hercules'' Statement of Facts and submits 
the following clarifications and additional factual statements. 
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A. CLARIFICATION OF HERCULES7 STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Paragraph 2 of Hercules' Statement of Facts states that 
one of Hercules' eight business groups is the Aerospace business 
group which designs and produces aerospace propulsion systems and 
products, and composite structures. The County would note that the 
Bacchus Works is responsible for 83% of the business of the 
Aerospace group.1 
2. Paragraph 7 of Hercules7 Statement of Facts states that 
the U. S. government is the sole customer of the Bacchus Works' 
strategic missiles and missile systems production. Karen Watson 
1
 Tr., pp. 98-99: 
Q. Have you made a breakdown with respect to the 
amount of business conducted by Bacchus Works as a 
percentage of the total business conducted by Hercules 
Aerospace Company? 
A. Yes, I have. 
• * * 
Q. All right. Why don't you tell me how you 
calculate it first. How do you make a calculation as a 
percentage of what is manufactured at Bacchus Works as 
compared to the other aerospace plants? 
A. You could do it basically as total assets at 
Bacchus over the total assets of the aerospace business. 
Q. Is that how you do it? 
A. That's the way I calculated it. And it's 
approximately 83 percent of all of aerospace. 
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testified that there was one exception.2 
3. In paragraphs 14, 16, and 19, Hercules states that 
because of the Challenger disaster and world events, Hercules 
experienced significant business reverses. However, the testimony 
of David R. Peirson, Hercules' manager of state and local taxes, 
indicated that, as of the lien date, prospects for business growth 
were good.3 
Tr. pp. 61-62: 
Q. So am I correct in saying that your only customer 
for the production at the Bacchus Works, the rocket motor 
production at the Bacchus Works is the U.S. Department of 
Defense? 
* * * 
THE WITNESS: With one exception. 
3
 Tr. at 108-109: 
Q. I'll ask a preliminary question first and then I will 
reask the same question. 
Was there a production by Hercules of the Titan as of 
January 1, 1990? 
A. The Titan is a research and development contract. There 
were expenses in research and development prior to and during 
1990. 
Q. Could I stop you right there and have you define what 
you meant by a research and development contract? 
A. It was a contract to develop this particular rocket 
motor for the United States government. 
Q. Was it an unlimited supply of Titans? 
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4. Paragraph 18 of Hercules Statement of Facts states that 
in 1989, the Hercules Aerospace Group suffered a $243 million loss, 
including a $323 million loss at the Bacchus Works. On cross-
examination, however, Mr. Peirson acknowledged that the loss might 
be recoverable.4 
A. No. The contract, the original contract, was for the 
production of 15 motors. 
Q. So what were the prospects, then, of production as of 
January 1, 1990? 
A. As of January 1, 1990, the prospects looked pretty good. 
MR. PETERS: I'll object. He certainly can talk about the 
prospects of January 1, 1990, but what has happened since then 
is totally irrelevant to this evaluation issue. 
MR. IWASAKI: Sustained. 
4
 Tr. at 135: 
Q. Now, a good portion of that write-off is potentially 
recoverable, isn't it? 
A. No, sir, it's not, not under these contracts. 
Q. I would like you to turn to page 3 of the annual report, 
if you would. 
* * * 
Q. Could you read the last two sentences of that report 
that starts off, as much as two-thirds? 
A. "As much as two-thirds of these charges may be recover-
able, and their recovery, should that occur, would have the 
effect of increasing future profitability. The charges relate 
primarily to the solid propulsion contracts for Titan IV and 
Delta II space-launch vehicles and SRAM." 
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5. Paragraph 23 of Hercules Statement of Facts notes that 
the accrued depreciation reduction includes physical deterioration 
(depreciation), functional obsolescence and economic (external) 
obsolescence. Paragraphs 25, 27, 29, and 31 note the amount of 
accrued depreciation assigned by Hercules' appraiser, Mr, Shoup, to 
each of the four Bacchus Works facilities. These statements 
acknowledge that the amounts for physical deterioration, functional 
obsolescence and economic obsolescence are not broken down by 
Hercules' appraiser, consistent with the Commission's Finding of 
Fact No. 7. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The County takes the position that the factual findings 
entered by the Commission in support of the Conclusions of Law and 
Final Decision are supported by substantial evidence, viewing the 
record as a whole. While the record contains evidence which could 
support Hercules' position, as it does the position of the County, 
§ 59-1-610(1)(a) requires that deference be given to the factual 
findings of the Commission and that such findings not be disturbed 
if there is substantial evidence contained in the record to support 
them. 
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POINT I 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN IMPOSING 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON HERCULES TO 
ESTABLISH THAT THE VALUE OF ITS PROPERTY 
WAS OTHER THAN THE COUNTY'S ASSESSMENT OF VALUE 
Hercules asserts that the Commission erroneously afforded a 
presumption of correctness to the County's valuation and that the 
imposition of the burden of proof to rebut that presumption upon 
Hercules, alone, is sufficient reason for this Court to reverse the 
decision of the Commission and remand this case to the Commission 
for a new determination of value. 
A clarification of the factual background is necessary to an 
understanding of the appropriateness of the Commission's legal 
conclusion. Prior to these proceedings, to accommodate the need of 
Hercules for security, confidentiality, and safety, Hercules and 
the County entered into an arrangement by which Hercules would 
report its construction costs to the County and those costs were 
aggregated over time and eventually reached a total of 
$211,397,230. Tr. 845-845. This method of determining the value 
of Hercules' property was mutually agreeable to the County and the 
taxpayer until the 1990 assessment was challenged by Hercules. As 
a result of Hercules' appeal to the Commission, and in light of 
additional information made available to the County in connection 
with the proceedings below, the County made certain adjustments to 
the assessed value of the property to account for depreciation and 
BTP15.062 9 
( 
other reductions to value which the County, through its employee, 3 
appraiser, and representative, Ed Kent, determined were appropri-
ate. 
The reality is that the Commission afforded a presumption of J 
correctness to the County's appraised value, but made adjustments 
to that value where the Commission, in the exercise of its 
discretion and supervisory responsibilities, and based upon •< 
substantial evidence, determined adjustments to be appropriate. To 
accept Hercules' argument, this Court must find that it is 
incumbent on the Commission to adopt an "all or nothing" approach 1 
in discharging its duty to review the decisions of county Boards of 
Equalization. Hercules has pointed to no authority which mandates 
this approach. 
Hercules asserts that the value to which Ed Kent testified is 
not the "County's statutory assessment"; that Mr. Kent's assessment 
is not entitled to a presumption of correctness; and that "the 
presumption of correctness only applies to property 'assessed by a 
state or county assessor'". In support of this proposition, 
Hercules cites Rio Alaom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184,
 1 
197 (Utah 1984). Rio Alaom does not address this issue in any 
substantive manner and notes only that: 
"Although there usually is a presumption 
that property assessed by a state or county 
assessor has been appraised at full value, the 
presumption applies only when a taxpayer 
BTP15.062 10 
challenges the valuation of his own property 
and not when he challenges the appraised value 
of another's property. 
Id-
The distinction that Hercules would have this Court draw is a 
distinction without a difference. Mr. Kent is an employee of the 
County Assessor's Office. He is employed as an appraiser and made 
the appraisal of the subject property in his official capacity. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, Hercules' argument would make it 
impossible for the County to correct errors in assessments when 
errors are discovered because to do so would nullify the "official" 
character of the assessment. 
Further, Hercules' argument ignores specific facts involved in 
this matter that nullify its position. Prior to the time that 
Hercules called the amounts of its assessment into question, the 
method by which Hercules' property was valued was unique to this 
taxpayer by virtue of the safety and national security aspects of 
its business. Hercules would annually report the amount it 
expended to improve its property. The reported amount would be 
added to the prior year's aggregate total to arrive at the new 
taxable value of the property.5 After Hercules called the value 
of its property for assessment purposes into question, the County 
reevaluated its use of this historical method, determined it to be 
5
 Tr. 279, 1006-1008. 
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incorrect and modified its original value, which resulted in a 
decrease of approximately $28 million. As the Utah Supreme Court 
noted in Utah Power & Light v. Utah State Tax Com'n., 590 P.2d 332 
(Utah 1979) : 
. . . The fact that the Commission has fol-
lowed a certain procedure in the past does not 
commit it to do so eternally. We can see no 
reason why it may not adopt new methods of 
appraisal procedure which are deemed to im-
prove them. 
590 P.2d at 334. 
The Utah Power and Light court determined that in a case where 
the taxpayer claims an error in its assessment, the taxpayer has 
the obligation to show substantial error in the assessment and to 
provide a sound evidentiary basis upon which the Tax Commission may 
adopt a lower valuation (id. at 335) and noted: 
. . . The universally recognized rule of the 
actions of administrative agencies requires 
this Court to take some cognizance of the 
expertise of the agency in its particular 
field and accordingly to give some deference 
to its determination, and not to upset the 
decision unless it appears that the action of 
the Commission is so in error or so unfair or 
unreasonable, that it must be regarded as 
arbitrary, a circumstance which we have not 
found present here. 
Id. [Footnote omitted.] 
Far from being discarded as an "unofficial assessment", the 
County's assessment, modified to take depreciation into consider-
ation (including an economic obsolescence factor), is entitled to 
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a presumption of correctness, the taxpayer (Hercules) having failed 
to provide a sound evidentiary basis to support its assertion of a 
lower valuation, 
POINT II 
THE FACTUAL FINDINGS IN THE COMMISSION'S 
FINAL DECISION ARE AMPLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE RECORD 
The factual findings of the Commission may not be overturned 
for the reason that this Court, or any other reviewing court, finds 
evidence in the record more convincingly supportive of Hercules' 
position than of the Commission's decision. The factual findings 
of the Commission may only be reversed if there is such an absence 
of evidence to support those findings that they may only be viewed 
as arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Utah Power & Light v. 
Utah State Tax Com'n.. 590 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1979). See, also, 
National Sun Industries v. Ransom County, 474 N.W.2d 502, 506 (N.D. 
1991). As noted by the court in Truitt v. Dept. of Rev., 732 P.2d 
497, 499 (Or. 1987): 
The tax court commented: "This case is a 
classic illustration of the problems encoun-
tered in valuing industrial property for ad 
valorem tax purposes. The disparate positions 
of the parties, both in attitude and results, 
would leave reasonable [persons] scratching 
their heads." [Citation omitted.] . . . 
This case presents precisely the type of situation described 
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in Truitt. In its opening brief, Hercules accurately identified 
the major source of dispute in this case — the appropriate amount 
of economic and/or functional obsolescence to be assigned to 
Hercules' property. That was the major source of contention during 
the entire appraisal process and Hercules did little to clarify 
matters during the formal hearing. In fact, Hercules presented 
two witnesses with entirely different points of view relative to 
this pivotal issue. Further, this wasn't something inadvertent 
which occurred, unforeseen, during the hearing. It was anticipated 
and planned by Hercules.6 
6
 In his opening statement, counsel for Hercules made the 
following statement (Tr. at pp. 22-23): 
"One of the principal differences is, or perhaps the 
principal difference, as I mentioned a moment ago, is that in 
Shoup's opinion some of that property should be valued as 
personal property and not real property improvements. The 
physical depreciation was assigned a value of approximately 
$23 million by the county, zero by Shoup and zero by Crawford. 
The functional obsolescence was assigned a value of approxi-
mately four million by the county, zero by Shoup, and $33 
million by Dr. Crawford. 
"The big area of contention in this case is external 
obsolescence. Again, going back to the analogy of the glass 
half full. The county simply took an arbitrary percentage of 
10 percent of the value of the property for approximately $21 
million. Shoup valued or assigned a value of external 
obsolescence or assigned appropriate numbers for external 
obsolescence, which he believes includes functional obsoles-
cence, physical obsolescence and external obsolescence, at 
approximately $90 million. And Dr. Crawford assigned a value 
of approximately $134 million." 
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Hercules acknowledges in its opening brief that the amount of 
depreciation deducted by its appraiser, Paul Shoup, was not 
separated into its separate components (physical depreciation, 
economic obsolescence, and functional obsolescence), but was lumped 
into one figure for "accumulated depreciation".7 In contrast, Ed 
Kent, the County's appraiser accounted separately for each aspect 
of his depreciation deduction.8 It is clear, then, that the 
Commission did not simply reject the amount of accumulated 
depreciation Shoup asserted should be deducted, but also rejected 
the lack of specific testimony to support the various aspects of 
Shoup's determination.9 
Further, when the Commission concluded that Shoup's "lump-sum 
depreciation without distinguishing the factors that went into that 
figure and their relative impact on the final figure is unsatisfac-
tory and unacceptable"10, it did not determine that the "valuation 
methodology" was "unsatisfactory and unacceptable", as asserted by 
7
 Brief of Petitioner, p. 9, 55 25, 27, 29, and 31. 
8
 Id., 55 24, 26, 28, and 30. 
9
 See Findings of Fact Nos. 14, 15, 16, and 17. 
10
 See Conclusions of Law, p . 11, 5 7. 
BTP15.062 15 
Hercules in its opening brief11, but merely found the manner in 
which Shoup employed the methodology to be inappropriate. 
The evidence in the record supporting the County's assessment 
is discussed below. 
A. The Original County Assessment: 
In 1989, the Salt Lake County Assessor's Office reappraisal 
program included Hercules Bacchus Works located in West Valley, 
Utah, at approximately 4600 South 7200 West.12 Two County apprais-
ers, Eddie J. Kent ("Kent") and Jona Hansen, were assigned to 
inventory the property. The inventory included documenting 
construction since 1978 and verifying and updating County records 
from the 1978 reappraisal conducted by the State Tax Commission.13 
In May 1989, representatives of the Assessor's Office, including 
Kent and Hansen, met with Hercules representatives. The purpose of 
the meeting was to arrange for the on-site inventory by Kent and 
Hansen, identify the Hercules participants and the reappraisal 
schedule.14 As a result of the meeting, Hercules permitted the 
11
 See Brief of Petitioner, p. 22, n. 10. 
12
 Tr. 836, Testimony of Ed Kent. 
13
 Id. ' 
14
 T r . 270 , Tes t imony of Jona Hansen. 
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inventory to occur from June 1 to September l.15 During the 
meeting the County appraisers were told that Hercules was proceed-
ing with cautious optimism that it would experience growth and that 
was the reason for expanding its facility.16 
Thereafter, Kent and Hansen personally inspected over 700 
primary and support buildings and other improvements in the four 
facilities; Plants 1, 3, NIROP, and Bacchus West. Each improvement 
constructed since 1978 was inventoried, photographed; grade and 
condition assigned; and measured.17 A commercial inventory card 
reflected the data collected.18 All improvements identified in the 
1978 state reappraisal were also verified. Pictures of all 
significant structures were taken by the County. Most of the 
pictures used by Shoup in his appraisal were taken by the County 
appraisers. 
As a result of the inventory, the County's records reflect a 
gross building area of 2,127,64 3 square feet in 316 primary 
Tr. 836. 
Tr. 872. 
Tr. 271-272; Tr. 842. The personal involvement of the 
County appraisers is in stark contrast to the involvement 
of Shoup, relied upon the photographs taken by the County 
appraisers (Tr. 344-345) and inspected only a fraction of 
the buildings contained within the Bacchus Works (Tr. 
343-348). 
Tr. 271. 
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buildings and 431,549 square feet in 386 support buildings, storage 
structures, and ingredient mix haulway and mix bowl tramway.19 
Once the inventory was completed, the County assigned a value 
to the property for the lien date of January 1, 1990. The County 
added the 1989 construction costs Hercules reported to the County 
to the 1988 assessed value.20 This method was based on an agree-
ment between Hercules and the County dating from 1974. The purpose 
of the agreement was to protect Hercules and County employees and 
to limit interruptions of Hercules operations.21 The County solely 
relied on information supplied by Hercules to determine assessed 
value. Until 1990, Hercules had not appealed the assessed values 
of its real property. Each year David Peirson, the property tax 
manager of Hercules reviewed the reported costs of additional 
improvements submitted to the County for compliance with State 
law.22 
Hercules reported approximately $44 million in construction 
costs incurred in 1989. Between 1986 and the end of 1989, it 
incurred over $147 million in construction costs in developing its 
R-4; p. 21. 
Tr. 845. 
Tr. 1006-1008, Testimony of Larry Butterfield; Tr. 279. 
Tr. 89, Testimony of David R. Peirson. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
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rocket motor facility.23 Construction increased significantly each 
year with approximately 35% of the costs incurred in 1989.24 The 
most significant construction occurred at the rocket motor facility 
at Bacchus West.25 Of the $147,359,000 in new construction, 
approximately $95 million was incurred at Bacchus West and $32 
million at Plant 1. These costs were in addition to what was 
already there prior to 1986. 
The County appraisal describes Hercules Bacchus Works as an 
aerospace propulsion and composite structures development and 
manufacturing facility. It is comprised of four separate plants; 
Plant 1, NIROP, and Bacchus West which are dedicated to rocket 
propulsion development and manufacturing and Plant 3 for graphite 
fiber manufacturing and composite structures development. 
B. Replacement/Reproduction Cost. 
Kent then determined the replacement or reproduction cost new 
for each of the improvements. He used the actual construction 
costs reported by Hercules, Inc.; if actual construction costs were 
not available he used costs reported in Marshall Valuation 
Services.26 Since the actual costs date from 1980, they were 
23
 E x . 15 
24
 E x . 15B. 
25
 E x . 15A. 
26
 E x . R - 4 ; p . 5 0 . 
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factored to current construction cost estimates. The factors were 
obtained from Marshall Valuation Service.27 
Utilizing the County's inventory, Kent identified each 
improvement; established the year built; the effective age; size; 
reported cost and cost per square foot. He then applied the cost 
factor from Marshall Valuation Service to arrive at the total 
present cost for each improvement.28 
The cost of the improvements were then added to obtain a 
reproduction cost new for each plant. Costs associated with each 
plant were added to arrive at the total cost new of the Hercules 
improvements of $217,278,420.29 
C. Economic Obsolescence: 
As to Plant 1, ten percent economic obsolescence resulted in 
a reduction in the Replacement Cost New of improvements of 
$5,153,230; for NIROP, a reduction of $3,218,118; for Plant 3, a 
reduction of $4,408,944; and for Bacchus West, a reduction of 
$10,874,056. In his analysis of economic obsolescence, Kent stated 
that there were two methods to measure economic obsolescence: the 
income approach or the sales comparison approach.30 The income 
27
 Ex. R-4; pp. 50-51. 
28
 Ex. R-4 ; p p . 52-65 (unnumbered i n R - 4 ) . 
29
 Ex. R - 5 ; p . 6 6 . 
30
 Ex. K-4, p . 70 ; R. 4 , p p . 7 1 - 7 3 . 
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approach could not be used because Hercules refused to provide any 
income and operating information, claiming it was proprietary.31 
The second method is to compare similar properties subject to 
the same negative influence and others that are not. Mr. Kent 
noted that if pertinent sales data are abundant, this is a 
preferable procedure, but because the property is so specific in 
design and use, the availability of comparable sales is virtually 
non-existent. Empirical data was, therefore, limited due in part 
to Hercules' refusal to provide income data and the special use of 
31
 Tr. 996-997: 
Q. You were asked to look at what's been marked as Exhibit 
P-31, specifically that portion dealing with external obsoles-
cence. Do you have that in front of you? Now, you did make 
a determination of external obsolescence. And what did you 
rely on for purposes of determining your external obsoles-
cence? 
A. I used Hercules' actual cost reportings. I also read 
and familiarized myself with their annual business reports and 
the 10-K report that Mr. Jones had discussed earlier. 
Q. Now, I believe you had indicated that you had requested 
information regarding the income attributable to the facility 
but you were not allowed to have access to that; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. That was my understanding. 
Q. Had you had access to that kind of information, would 
that have been a way to measure external obsolescence? 
A# Yes. 
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the property. 
Kent assigned 10% economic obsolescence to each facility for 
a total of $22 million.32 This was based on Hercules' reported 
construction costs; Hercules' annual reports from 1988 and 1989, 
its " 10-K" report,33 and Hercules' expectation for growth.34 For 
example, the actual construction cost reports evidence that from 
1985 through the end of 1989, Hercules expended $147,458,667 on 
additional plant construction.35 Hercules' "10-K" report as of 
December 31, 1989, shows a backlog of orders for Hercules Aerospace 
of approximately $2.4 billion compared with $2.2 billion on 
December 31, 1988. Bacchus Works represents 83% of Hercules 
Aerospace assets.36 Expenditures for research and development 
increased in 1989 over expenditures in 1987 and 1988. The 1990 
annual report reflects net sales in the Aerospace segment of 
32
 Ex. R-4, pp. 70-71; Tr. 869. 
33
 Tr. 1003. 
34
 Tr. 870. 
35 Contrary to Hercules7 assertion, Kent did not ignore the 
fact that the construction of the Bacchus West facilities 
took years to construction and years to design. Her-
cules' transcript citation in support of this outrageous 
statement is actually to the testimony of Richard 
Cloward, an employee of Hercules, and not to any evidence 
presented by Kent or any data relied upon by him. 
36 Ex. R-9, p . 1. 
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Hercules increased in 1989 over reported sales in 1987 and 1988.37 
Kent did, however, qualify his opinion of 10% economic 
obsolescence, believing it may be overstated.38 The amount of 
growth experienced each year in construction costs alone led him to 
believe that the facility does not exhibit external obsolescence by 
the amount of growth experienced each year.39 The testimony of 
Eckhardt Prawitt, Dr. Ted Jones and Russ Sanderson support the 
conclusion that there was no economic obsolescence present at the 
Hercules Bacchus works. 
Eckhardt Prawitt analyzed Hercules' share of the aerospace 
market. During 1989, Hercules' performance relative to the market 
did not decline. If it had declined, one would conclude economic 
obsolescence existed. Also, Prawitt testified that if Hercules 
were suffering from obsolescence during 1989, its price-to-book 
ratios would have dropped relative to the two industry groups. T. 
p. 114, lines 1 - 5 . There was no discernable drop in Hercules' 
stock during the period pertinent to 1-1-90. The only dip related 
to defense industry companies without missile contracts, which 
would not include Hercules. T. p. 714, lines 1 8 - 2 4 . 
In addition, Prawitt determined the price-to-book ratio to 
37
 Ex. P-18(c) , and 18(d) . 
38
 Tr. 868; Tr. 1002. 
39
 Tr. 868. 
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ascertain whether there was any obsolescence in those assets, R-ll 
(Here. 6 & 7). In his opinion, the presence of heavy discounts 
from price to book ratio would reflect obsolescence. His analysis 
reflected no heavy discounts, and therefore no obsolescence was 
present. T. p. 715, lines 1 4 - 2 4 . Dr. Ted Jones, who analyzed 
Hercules 10-K report and Value Line, concluded that the reports 
painted a relatively optimistic outlook for Bacchus Works. Russell 
Sanderson confirmed this positive view through his testimony of 
meetings he attended wherein Hercules7 representatives painted a 
very optimistic view of its business. 
In conclusion, economic obsolescence may not exist at all. 
Kent concluded that there may be no economic obsolescence and that 
ten percent may be overstated. Two experts analyzed the data 
provided to investors. One concluded no economic obsolescence 
existed. The other concluded that the data painted an optimistic 
view of the company to investors. This picture is consistent with 
the one painted by Hercules to local government, its shareholders 
and the bonding agencies. The Commission could reasonably conclude 
that no economic obsolescence existed, or it could accept Kent's 
determination of obsolescence, which it did. 
D. Functional Obsolescence. 
Kent examined the property for functional obsolescence. Since 
he used replacement cost in Plants 1 and NIROP on all but five 
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percent of the improvements, only 5% of the improvements in these 
plants suffer from functional obsolescence.40 Because Plant 3 and 
40
 Ex. R-4, p. 69 and Tr. 861-862: 
A. I then estimated the functional obsolescence. In doing 
that I used replacement cost on the majority of buildings in 
Plant 1 and NIROP. And by using replacement cost as opposed 
to reproduction cost, I am constructing a building of similar 
utility, therefore not constructing an exact replica and 
building in the functional obsolescence that may or may not be 
prevalent with the structure, special use structure. 
I then went back through in Plant 1 and NIROP, estimated 
the substantial, or what we categorized as major buildings 
built from 1980 through 1989 that we had complete costs on, 
calculated the ratio of those buildings compared to the total 
buildings to come up with a ratio of functional obsolescence 
that would be applied to the cost new of each one of those 
plants. 
I did not consider any functional obsolescence in Plant 
3. Those structures are basically typical manufacturing 
buildings, could easily be adapted to an alternative use, and 
in my opinion did not suffer from functional obsolescence. 
The Bacchus West facility is the most recently construct-
ed and modern facility out there, and I do not believe that 
there's any functional obsolescence attributed to those 
improvements. 
Q. And so for Plant 1 and NIROP, you attributed a 
certain percentage, I believe? 
A. Yes. The ratio that I calculated on Plant 1 was 
6.7 percent and the ratio on NIROP was 6.87 percent. I 
rounded them to five percent. 
Q. And if you look down at page 7 — page 71 of your 
appraisal, does that reflect your determination of functional 
obsolescence on Plant 1 and NIROP? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And does i t also r e f l ec t the physical de te r iora t ion 
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Bacchus West were built within the last five years, Kent found that 
the improvements did not suffer from functional obsolescence.41 
This conclusion was also supported by Shoup, Hercules' appraiser, 
who stated that Plant 3 suffers "minor functional inutility" and 
"little functional obsolescence would be inherent in Bacchus West 
because of its relatively new specialized design."42 
or physical depreciation which you attributed in total to each 
of those plants? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Tr. 964-965: 
A. As I stated earlier in my testimony, in Plant 1 and 
NIROP, I used replacement cost on those buildings, that I did 
not have a total reported cost from Hercules. That would 
exclude functional obsolescence. 
Q. Incurable functional obsolescence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Well, you gave five percent any way, didn't you? 
A. Yes. Because five percent of the costs, five 
percent of the buildings in those plants, I utilized Hercules' 
costs for. 
Q. Why didn't you use 25 percent rather than five 
percent? 
A. Because that was the ratio. 
Ex. R - 5 , p . 6 9 . 
Ex. P - 2 6 ( a ) , p . 8 5 . 
26 
41 
42 
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E. Land Value, 
Kent identified eight comparable land sales.43 He made 
adjustments to each as necessary. The adjustment considered 
property rights conveyed; financing; conditions of sales; market 
conditions or adjustments for the sale; location; topography; size; 
utilities; and zoning.44 He determined the adjusted price per acre 
on each sale. He then averaged them and determined the average 
price per acre was $10,500. The total land value for 1,514.66 
acres was $16,550,000.27.45 This is the only evidence in the 
record relative to the land value. Shoup merely adopted the 
County's original land value rather than make his own independent 
appraisal determination. 
F. Depreciation. 
Physical depreciation was estimated for each improvement using 
Marshall Valuation Service's physical depreciation tables. Kent 
examined each building and because of the difference in age and 
degrees of curable and incurable physical depreciation observed by 
him, he estimated physical depreciation for each.46 The physical 
depreciation estimated was 15.8% ($8,168,963) for Plant 1; 16.8% 
43
 Ex. R-4; pp. 35-42. 
44
 Ex. R-4; pp. 43-47. 
45
 Ex. R-4; pp. 48-49; Tr. 852, 856. 
46
 Ex. R-4 ; p p . 6 8 ; 52-65 (unnumbered p a g e s ) . 
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($5,390,430) for NIROP; 7.8% ($1,926,506) for Plant 3; and 7.7% 
($8,380,614) for Bacchus West. The County appraisers testified 
that the Hercules facilities were extremely well maintained.47 
Hercules' Securities and Exchange Commission report supports this 
conclusion.48 
Kent then examined the property for functional obsolescence. 
Since he used replacement costs in Plants 1 and NIROP on all but 
five percent of the improvements, only five percent of the 
improvements in these plants suffer from functional obsolescence.49 
Because Plant 3 and Bacchus West were built within the last five 
years, Kent found that the improvements did not suffer from 
functional obsolescence.50 This conclusion was also supported by 
Shoup who stated that Plant 3 suffers "minor functional inutility" 
and little functional obsolescence "would be inherent in Bacchus 
West because of its relatively new specialized design."51 
The above detailed outline of the evidence adduced at the 
formal hearing more than amply supports the factual findings of the 
Commission and meets the "substantial evidence" standard which is 
47
 T r . 844; T r . 2 7 7 - 2 7 8 . 
48
 Ex. 9 , p . 3 . 
49
 Ex. R-4 ; p . 69 , T r . 8 6 1 . 
50
 Ex. R - 5 ; p . 6 9 . 
51
 Ex. P - 2 6 ( a ) , p . 8 5 . 
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required to sustain the Findings of Fact of the Commission. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY HERCULES WAS 
FLAWED AND INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE TAXING AUTHORITIES 
The Commission found the evidence presented by Hercules 
unpersuasive and one-sided. Examples of the pre-determined 
opinions of Hercules' experts abound in the record. Dr. Crawford52 
testified that, far from participating to present objective 
evidence and assist the Commission is determining the true cash 
value of Hercules' property, he considered himself a part of the 
"Parsons, Behle advocacy team" (Tr. 666). 
Shoup's testimony indicated that he was unsure concerning the 
cost methodology used in reaching his ultimate determination of 
52
 Hercules asserts that the Commission misunderstood the 
purpose of Dr. Crawford's testimony, when the Commission determined 
to give no weight to the testimony because Dr. Crawford was not 
certified in the field of real property appraisal. Hercules now 
argues that Dr. Crawford was not called to opine concerning the 
fair market value of the property, but rather to support Shoup's 
determination of accrued depreciation. However, Mr. Miller 
represented to the Commission that he intended to offer into 
evidence an "appraisal" that Dr. Crawford had prepared (Tr. 550) 
and Dr. Crawford identified Exhibit 28-A as a report on the 
appraised value of Hercules Bacchus Works (Tr. 551). 
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value.53 Shoup agreed that the highest and best use of the 
facility was as propellant and rocket motor production plant. (Tr. 
360). The economic obsolescence assigned by Shoup to the produc-
tion facilities was based upon its use as a propellant and rocket 
motor production plant and the alleged decline in that industry. 
(Tr. 367-368) Yet Shoup's determination of "replacement cost" does 
not include the cost of replacing those very improvements which 
make the facility suitable for use as a rocket/missile production 
plant; i.e., the foundations, piping, fire control sprinklers and 
electrical wiring. Shoup testified that these improvements were 
"excess" and should be characterized as personal property. (Tr. 
348-353). The Shoup appraisal, therefore, contains a replacement 
or reproduction cost which renders the plant totally useless for 
its "highest and best" use, while assigning economic obsolescence 
based upon that "highest and best use". This inconsistency results 
in a double reduction which explains much of the disparity between 
Shoup and Kent. The first reduction by costing the improvements at 
something other than highest and best use and the second by 
determining the presence of unmeasured economic obsolescence. 
The differences in value occasioned by the reproduction cost 
Shoup testified that "in all probability, what we did was 
we selected, for foundation, a price that was probably in 
this instance, from somewhere in terms of the square foot 
cost of class C type building." Tr. 452. 
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method used in the Shoup appraisal is staggering• The Bacchus 
Works facilities contains in excess of 2,366,000 square feet (Tr. 
334). The differences in reproduction costs between the improve-
ments as they exist and as Shoup determined they should be 
reproduced in a regular manufacturing plant varies from a few cents 
to $12 per square foot. (Tr. 348-353). The Commission found this 
conflict in the methodologies used by Shoup to arrive at a value 
inappropriate and unpersuasive. (Conclusions of Law 5 6, p. 10). 
POINT IV 
WHEN HERCULES PLACED THE VALUE OF 
ITS PROPERTY AT ISSUE, THE COMMISSION 
WAS THEN ENTITLED TO EVALUATE THE ASSESSED 
VALUE OF ALL HERCULES' PROPERTY 
In its notice of appeal to the Commission, Hercules objected 
to the decision of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization: 
. . . for the following reasons, among others: 
(a) The Findings and Conclusions of the 
Salt Lake County Board of Equalization are 
erroneous and without factual and legal sup-
port . 
(b) There is no legitimate or proper 
basis for the assessed value assigned by the 
Salt Lake County assessor, and this assessed 
value is not based upon any accepted, or 
proper valuation methodology. 
R. 683. 
In essence, Hercules in its appeal to the Tax Commission put 
at issue the entire value of its property, as determined by the 
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taxing authorities, but, on appeal to this Court, seeks to limit 
the scope of review to the value of improvements, exclusive of 
land. The Utah Supreme Court rejected a similar attempt by the 
taxpayer in Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451 (Utah 
1985), and held: 
. . . In this case, Kennecott itself com-
plained that the 20% reduction of county-
assessed property values had unlawfully in-
creased Kennecott's tax burden, and the County 
responded by a counterclaim and cross-claim 
challenging the valuation of Kennecott's 
properties. On general equitable principles, 
Kennecott is in no position to ask a court to 
adjudicate the allegation that its taxes are 
too high and then claim that the court cannot 
adjudicate the allegation that the valuation 
of Kennecott's property is too low because of 
an allegedly unconstitutional statute. By 
alleging underassessment of locally assessed 
properties, Kennecott put the valuation of its 
own state-assessed properties at issue. 
[Citation and footnote omitted.] Accordingly, 
Salt Lake County was entitled to raise the 
issue of the valuation of Kennecott's proper-
ty. 
702 P.2d, at 456. 
Here, Hercules challenged the method by which the County 
assessed real property and improvements to real property, chal-
lenged the County's conclusions as to the value of its property, 
and challenged the County's classification of the property as 
between real and personal property. The scope of the challenge by 
the taxpayer required the Commission's review of virtually every 
aspect of the valuation. Having initiated the process and placed 
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the value of its property at issue, Hercules should not now be 
allowed to selectively limit the results of that challenge. 
The fact that the appraiser for Hercules failed to indepen-
dently appraise the value of the land and chose to rely upon the 
initial land value determined by the County cannot be overcome 
merely by attempting to limit review by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The factual findings of the Commission are amply supported by 
substantial evidence, considering the record as a whole. The 
appraisal submitted by Hercules is based upon contradictory 
assumptions, which ignore the business purpose of the facility and 
its highest and best use, when arriving at the replacement cost of 
the improvements, but give almost exclusive consideration to the 
business purpose and its highest and best use when assigning 
economic obsolescence. The testimony of Dr. Crawford was properly 
excluded from consideration for the reason that Dr. Crawford was 
not a certified real estate appraiser and is precluded, by statute 
(U.C.A. § 61-2b-3), from giving an opinion concerning the value of 
the property. His testimony on cross examination demonstrated he 
was not an appraiser and did not understand appraisal methodology. 
The evidence supports the value assigned to the property by 
the County's appraiser. Contrary to the assertions of Hercules, 
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the amount of depreciation assigned by Kent, who unlike Shoup, 
personally visited nearly all of the subject property, are broken 
down into various components and the factors which were considered 
by Kent in reaching those conclusions are set forth in detail. 
Shoup, on the other hand, did not and could not identify the amount 
of economic obsolescence. 
Hercules has not met its burden and has failed to establish 
that the value of its property was other than that originally 
established by the County, as modified by the appraisal submitted 
by Kent at the formal hearing. For these reasons, the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision of the Commission 
should be affirmed. 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
HERCULES, INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. ) 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal Nos. 91-0603 to 
91-0678 
Serial Nos. See Attached 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for 
a formal hearing beginning May 19, 1992 and concluding on May 28, 
1992. Paul F. Iwasaki, Presiding Officer, Joe B. Pacheco, 
Commissioner, and S. Blaine Willes, Commissioner, heard the matter 
for and on behalf of the Commission. Present and representing the 
Petitioner were Kent W. Winterholler and Maxwell A. Miller of 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer. Present and representing the Respondent 
were Bill Thomas Peters, Special Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
and Mary Ellen Sloan, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is property tax. 
2. The lien date in question is January 1, 1990. 
3. The subject property consists of six parcels of land 
and improvements thereon owned by the Petitioner and located in 
Salt Lake County. 
Appeal Nos. 91-0603 to 91-0678 
4. The Petitioner is a producer of various products and 
operates a number of major plants throughout the United States. At 
its facilities in Salt Lake County, the Petitioner builds rocket 
motors and manufactures carbon graphite fibers. The Bacchus Work's 
property is comprised of four major plants: Plant 1; NIROP; Plant 
3; and Bacchus West. 
5. For the lien date in question, the Salt Lake County 
Assessor's Office originally valued the subject property at 
$211,397,230. The Petitioner appealed that determination to the 
Salt Lake County Board of Equalization which, after a hearing, 
sustained that value. 
6. The Petitioner filed its appeal to this body on or 
about March 29, 1991. 
7. Both parties utilized a Reproduction/Replacement Cost 
New Less Depreciation ("RCNLD") approach to determine the market 
value of the subject property. 
8. The Petitioner's valuation witness, Paul Shupe, 
utilized the following methodologies in arriving at his estimate of 
value: ^ 
(a) Plant 1: 
Mr. Shupe examined 25 buildings and used those 
buildings for pricing models for other buildings that 
were either identical or so similar that adjustments 
could easily be made. Mr. Shupe then priced those 
-2-
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buildings using Marshall Swift Valuation Service as a 
guide to each building's cost. On those buildings 
constructed since 1985, Mr. Shupe used historical cost 
and then made adjustments for time and any additional 
costs as provided by the Petitioner. 
(b) NIROP: 
Mr. Shupe followed the same methodology as used 
in appraising Plant I. 
(c) Plant 3: 
Mr. Shupe priced the buildings using Marshall 
Swift Valuation Service as a guide to determine each 
buildings cost. 
(d) Bacchus West: 
With the exception of nine buildings where Mr. 
Shupe used the Marshall Swift Service, Mr. Shupe used the 
historical costs provided by the Petitioner and then made 
adjustments to those costs by deducting costs for those 
amounts he determined to be in excess of those listed by 
the Marshall Swift Service for items such as foundation 
costs, electrical systems costs, and plumbing costs. Mr. 
Shupe testified that, in his opinion, amounts in excess 
of the Marshall Swift guidelines represented personal 
property costs and therefore should not be included in 
the determination of value for the real property. -
-3-
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9. Mr. Shupe determined the Replacement Cost New ("RCN") 
for each plant, including yard and outside as follows: 
(a) Plant 1 = $ 50,998,223 
(b) NIROP = $ 22,292,733 
(c) Plant 3 = $ 19,806,006 
(d) Bacchus West = $ 38,292,223 
TOTAL = $131.389,185 
11. Mr. Shupe, applying the formula of effective age 
over economic life to determine the amount of depreciation, found 
the percentage of depreciation for each plant to be as follows: 
(a) Plant 1: 40/45 = 89% 
(b) NIROP: 35/45 = 78% 
(c) Plant 3: 25/45 - 56% 
(d) Bacchus West: 20/45 = 44% 
12. Based upon such depreciation, Mr. Shupe valued the 
subject property at $45,500,000 which includes a land value of 
$4,805,000. 
13. Mr. Shupe determined the land value should be $4,000 
an acrB. This was based upon the county's original land value of 
approximately $4,100 per acre and his discussions with other real 
estate brokers and appraisers. From those discussions he concluded 
the land value as previously determined by the county to be 
equitable. 
-4-
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14. To determine the effective age, Mr. Shupe considered 
such factors as physical depreciation, utilization, and functional 
and external obsolescence. Each factor was then combined with the 
others to arrive at a lump-sum figure of accrued depreciation. 
With no differentiation or segregation between those items. Mr. 
Shupe did not demonstrate within his appraisal the mathematics used 
to conclude the reasons why the economic life and effective age 
were as asserted for each property. 
15. In considering functional obsolescence, Mr. Shupe 
examined the amount of rocket propellant manufactured in each 
facility per month in relation to the square footage of that 
facility. The lower the ratio of propellant manufactured to square 
footage, the greater the amount of functional obsolescence. No 
numerical amounts were assigned to this aspect of depreciation. 
16. In considering external or economic obsolescence, 
Mr. Shupe attempted to determine what the demand for rockets and 
rocket propellants would be in the future. He then determined that 
demand for such products would decrease due to the perceived easing 
of tensions between this country and the then communist countries. 
No numerical amounts were assigned to this aspect of depreciation. 
17. In considering the lump-sum accrued depreciation, 
Mr. Shupe compared the subject property with other facilities in 
different areas of the country, none of which were engaged in the 
same business as the Petitioner. From those comparisons, he 
- 5 - • 
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arrived at a percentage which he attributed to the combined 
economic and functional obsolescence and physical depreciation 
which was factored into his determination of market value of the 
subject property and concluded that this confirmed his analysis of 
economic life and effective age. 
18. The Petitioner also presented an expert witness in 
the field of economics, Dr. Robert Crawford, who testified that 
from an economic standpoint, the "value" of the subject property 
under the cost approach was $32,2 05,000 and under the income 
approach was between $50-65 million depending upon the 
capitalization rate used. 
19. Dr. Crawford has expertise in economic theory but no 
demonstrated expertise or training, nor is he certified, as a real 
property appraiser. 
20. The Respondent's witness, Mr. Eddie J. Kent who is 
a certified real property appraiser, also used the cost approach 
("RCNLD") to determine the fair market value of the subject 
property. In so doing, Mr. Kent arrived at a land value of 
$16,550,000 based upoirvsales of comparable parcels of property. 
21. Mr. Kent established a reproduction or replacement 
cost new for the improvements, using whenever possible, the 
Petitioner's actual reported costs for those improvements. For 
those buildings where actual costs were not available, the 
Petitioner used Marshall Swift Valuation figures. 
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22. Based upon the above, Mr. Kent determined the RCN 
for each of the facilities which are summarized in Schedule 1. See 
Schedule 1, Page 9. 
23. Mr. Kent also included in his appraisal as real 
property improvements a tramway, haulageway and bridge located at 
the Bacchus West facility. The values were determined by Mr. Kent 
to be $3,992,918, $3,581,321 and $1,367,447 respectively. 
24. Mr. Kent made adjustments for physical depreciation 
based upon a comparison of effective age to remaining economic life 
of each of the structures, and also by referring to Marshall Swift 
Depreciation Schedules to arrive at the physical depreciation 
percentages and figures for each facility as shown in Schedule 1. 
25. Mr. Kent made adjustments for functional 
obsolescence to Plant 1 and NIROP by using a replacement cost 
analysis which, in theory and when used properly, eliminates 
functional problems. The percentage and amount of adjustments are 
summarized in Schedule 1. 
26. No adjustments for functional obsolescence to Plant 
3 were made because, in the appraiser's opinion, the buildings were 
typical manufacturing buildings and could be adapted for alternate 
use. 
27. No adjustments for functional obsolescence for 
Bacchus West were made because those buildings were of recent 
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construction and, in the appraiser's opinion, no functional 
obsolescence existed. 
28* The appraiser also made adjustments for economic 
obsolescence and estimated that a 10% adjustment was necessary. 
This opinion was based upon the Petitioner's appraisal experience 
and his evaluation of the effect of ongoing peace negotiations and 
the decreased threat by the Soviet Union and also based upon 
examination of the Petitioner's construction documents and its 
business reports. These adjustments are also summarized in 
Schedule 1. 
29. After having made the above described adjustments, 
Mr. Kent appraised the subject property at $183,000,000. See 
summary on Schedule 1. 
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SUMMARY OF RESPONDENT'S APPRAISAL 
Plant 1 
i 
vo 
1
 NIROP 
Plant 3 
Bacchus West 
RCN for Each Adljustment for 
Facility Physical Depreciation 
$ 51,532,298 15.8% 
32,181,178 16.8% 
24,824,380 7.8% 
108.740.564 7.7% 
$217.278.420 
Land Value Estimate 
Total Indicated Value of Subject Property 
Rounded 
$8,168,963 
5,390,430 
1,926,506 
8,380.614 
$23.866.513 
SCHEDULE 1 
Adjustment for 
Functional 
Obsolescence 
5% 
5% 
0% 
0% 
$2,576,615 
1,609,059 
-0-
-0-
$4.185.674 
Adjustment for 
External Obsolescence 
10% 
10% 
10% 
10% 
5,153,230 
3,218,118 
2,482,438 
10.874.056 
$21.727.842 
Cost New Less 
Depreciation 
35,633,490 
21,963,571 
20,415,436 
89.485.894 
$167.498.391 
Cost New 
Summary 
Rounded 
35,633,000 
21,964,000 
20,415,000 
89,500,000 
$167,512,000 
16.055,000 
$183,567,000 
$183.000.000 
fchfdtd*. 1 
< 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Tax Commission is required to oversee the just 
administration of property taxes to ensure that property is valued 
for tax purposes according to fair market value- (Utah Code Ann. 
§59-1-210(7).) 
2. The Petitioner has the burden of proof to establish 
that the market value of the subject property is other than that as 
determined by the Respondent. 
3. "Personal Property" includes: . . . (c) bridges. . . 
(Utah Code Ann. §59-2-102(17).) 
4. The cost method of appraisal in establishing the fair 
market value for the subject property is an appropriate and 
acceptable methodology in this case. 
5. The testimony of Dr. Crawford who has no demonstrated 
expertise or certification in the field of real property appraisal 
is given no weight in determining the fair market value of the 
subject property. 
6. The determination of Mr. Shupe that foundation costs, 
electrical costs, and plumbing costs in excess of those amounts 
allocated by Marshall Swift Valuation Service represents personal 
property is unpersuasive and erroneous. The Commission finds that 
such items are parts of improvements to real property and are 
legitimately used for the unique purposes required of such 
improvements. 
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7. The Commission finds Mr. Shupe's determination of 
accrued depreciation is also unacceptable. Specifically, the 
Commission finds that Mr. Shupe's measurement of economic 
obsolescence by comparing the Petitioner's plant to other plants in 
other industries in other parts of the country to be a an attempt 
to draw conclusions from properties that are not comparable with 
the subject property. The Tax Commission further finds Mr. Shupe's 
lump-sum depreciation without distinguishing the factors that went 
into that figure and their relative impact on the final figure is 
unsatisfactory and unacceptable. 
8. The Tax Commission finds the appraisal submitted by 
the Respondent to be superior to that submitted by the Petitioner 
by a preponderance of the evidence, and the Respondent's final 
estimate of value to be reasonable based upon accepted principles 
of real property appraisal. The haulageway and bridge included in 
Mr. Kent's appraisal, however, as improvements to real property 
should have been excluded from the appraisal because they are items 
of personal property. 
^ DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that 
the fair market value of the subject property as of the lien date 
January 1, 1990 to be $183,000,000, less the amounts attributable 
to the tramway, haulageway and bridge located at Bacchus West. In 
addition, a deduction of 10% from each of those items should be 
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made to reflect the adjustment made for external obsolescence. The 
Salt Lake County Auditor's office is ordered to adjust its records 
in accordance with this decision 
DATED this 10 day of 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COi 
I t i s so o r d e r e d . 
Q///ri£^ . 1993 
MMISS LSSION. 
Chairman 
J o e B. Pacheco 
Commiss ioner 
(HoL^WuJiL 
S. Blaine Willes 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a petition 
for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13^ r^>rr::*;^ 3-46b-
hi SEAL r 
\\ A * * &S~*< 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
Hercules Incorporated 
c/o Kent W. Winterholler 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street #700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Robert L. Yates 
Salt Lake County Assessor 
2001 South State Street, N2200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Mike Reed 
Salt Lake County Auditor 
2001 South State Street, N2200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Karl Hendrickson 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, N3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Marc B, Johnson 
Tax Administrator 
2001 South State Street, N2200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Bill Thomas Peters 
Special Deputy Attorney 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
DATED this #r day of ^J/y^rtJl 1993. 
y/sisu7< 
Secretai 
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